OpenClaw Security Hardening Checklist: SSRF, Auth Bypass & RCE Prevention

Following today’s dual security disclosures — six patched CVEs from Endor Labs and 40,000+ exposed instances from SecurityScorecard — this guide walks you through exactly what to do to lock down your OpenClaw deployment. Whether you’re running OpenClaw locally, on a VPS, or in a corporate environment, these steps will dramatically reduce your attack surface.

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Step 1: Check Your Version (Do This First)

openclaw --version

You must be on v2026.2.14 or higher to have the six CVEs patched. If you’re below that, skip to Step 2 immediately — the remaining steps are moot until you’re on a patched version.

The six vulnerabilities (all patched in v2026.2.14+) include:

  • GHSA-pg2v-8xwh-qhcc — SSRF via unvalidated outbound requests
  • GHSA-v6c6-vqqg-w888 — Path traversal enabling file system escape
  • Missing authentication on internal API endpoints (3 variants)
  • Additional input validation bypass (1 variant)

Step 2: Upgrade to the Latest Release

# Via npm (most common)
npm update -g openclaw

# Verify you're on the patched version
openclaw --version
# Should show 2026.2.14 or higher (2026.2.21 is current as of this writing)

If you’re using Docker:

docker pull openclaw/openclaw:latest
docker run --rm openclaw/openclaw:latest openclaw --version

Why v2026.2.21 specifically? It also includes the SHA-1 → SHA-256 cryptographic migration. Patched CVEs + crypto hardening in one upgrade.


Step 3: Bind to Localhost (Critical for Single-User Deployments)

The #1 cause of the 40,000+ exposed instances is OpenClaw binding to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) by default. Unless you explicitly need remote access, lock it to localhost:

# Command-line flag
openclaw --host 127.0.0.1

# Or in your openclaw.yml config
server:
  host: "127.0.0.1"
  port: 3000

After making this change, verify with:

netstat -tlnp | grep 3000
# Should show 127.0.0.1:3000, NOT 0.0.0.0:3000

Step 4: Enable Authentication

Authentication is off by default in OpenClaw. This is the design decision behind the RCE exposure. Enable it:

# In openclaw.yml
auth:
  enabled: true
  key: "generate-a-strong-random-secret-here"

Generate a strong key:

openssl rand -hex 32

If you’re using OpenClaw’s API programmatically, include the key in your requests:

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY" http://localhost:3000/api/...

Step 5: Configure SSRF Protection

The SSRF vulnerability (GHSA-pg2v-8xwh-qhcc) allowed agents to make outbound requests to internal network addresses — enabling attackers to pivot from OpenClaw to your internal services. The patch adds a default-deny outbound guard, but you should explicitly configure your allowed destinations:

# In openclaw.yml
security:
  ssrf_protection:
    enabled: true
    allow_list:
      - "https://api.openai.com"
      - "https://api.anthropic.com"
      # Add only the external APIs your agents actually need
    block_private_ranges: true  # Blocks 10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x, 127.x

Blocking private ranges is the key protection — it prevents an agent from being used to probe your internal infrastructure.


Step 6: Restrict File System Access (Path Traversal)

The path traversal bug (GHSA-v6c6-vqqg-w888) let malicious inputs escape the intended working directory. Configure an explicit root:

# In openclaw.yml
filesystem:
  root: "/home/user/openclaw-workspace"
  allow_traversal: false  # Should default to false in 2026.2.14+

Verify your agents can only read/write within the intended workspace:

# This should fail if properly configured
openclaw eval "read file at ../../../../etc/passwd"

Step 7: Use a Reverse Proxy for External Access

If you genuinely need OpenClaw accessible from outside localhost (remote teams, multi-user deployments), do not expose it directly. Use a reverse proxy with TLS:

Caddy (simplest):

openclaw.yourdomain.com {
    reverse_proxy localhost:3000
    basicauth {
        user $HASHED_PASSWORD
    }
}

Nginx:

server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name openclaw.yourdomain.com;

    ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
    ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;

    location / {
        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3000;
        auth_basic "OpenClaw";
        auth_basic_user_file /etc/nginx/.htpasswd;
    }
}

Always combine this with IP allowlisting if your user base is known:

    allow 203.0.113.0/24;  # Your office IP range
    deny all;

Step 8: Audit Your Exposure (Check Yourself Before Shodan Does)

Verify what’s actually accessible from the internet before SecurityScorecard does it for you:

# From a machine outside your network (e.g., a VPS or use nmap online scanners)
nmap -p 3000 YOUR_SERVER_IP

# Or use curl from an external IP to test if OpenClaw responds without auth
curl -s http://YOUR_SERVER_IP:3000/api/status
# Should return 401 Unauthorized (if auth is enabled)
# Should time out or refuse connection (if bound to localhost)

You can also use Shodan to search for your own IP and see what’s indexed:

shodan host YOUR_SERVER_IP

Step 9: Rotate Secrets After Upgrading

The SHA-1 → SHA-256 migration in v2026.2.21 means any tokens or signatures generated by older versions used a weaker hash. Best practice: rotate your API keys, agent tokens, and any integration secrets after upgrading.

# Generate new secrets for each integration
openssl rand -hex 32  # OpenClaw auth key
openssl rand -hex 32  # Any skill/webhook secrets

Step 10: Consider Container Isolation for Production

If you want defense-in-depth beyond the application level, consider running OpenClaw inside a container — or evaluating NanoClaw for security-critical deployments. NanoClaw wraps every agent execution in OS-level container isolation (Apple Container on macOS, Docker on Linux), limiting blast radius even if an agent is compromised.

For OpenClaw in Docker with isolation:

docker run -d \
  --name openclaw \
  --network=none \  # No network access by default
  -v /home/user/workspace:/workspace:rw \
  -p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \  # localhost only
  openclaw/openclaw:latest

Security Hardening Checklist Summary

  • Running v2026.2.14 or higher (all 6 CVEs patched)
  • Upgraded to v2026.2.21 (SHA-256 migration)
  • Bound to 127.0.0.1, not 0.0.0.0
  • Authentication enabled with a strong key
  • SSRF protection configured with an explicit allow-list
  • Filesystem root locked, traversal disabled
  • Reverse proxy with TLS if external access is needed
  • IP allowlist on external-facing deployments
  • External exposure audited (nmap/Shodan)
  • Secrets rotated post-upgrade
  • Container isolation considered for high-risk deployments

Sources

  1. Infosecurity Magazine — Six OpenClaw CVEs (Endor Labs)
  2. Infosecurity Magazine — 40,000 Exposed Instances (SecurityScorecard)
  3. DailyCVE.com — GHSA Identifiers
  4. primerogueinc.com — CVSS 8.8 RCE Analysis
  5. NanoClaw GitHub — Container Isolation Approach
  6. OpenClaw v2026.2.21 Release Notes

Researched by Searcher → Analyzed by Analyst → Written by Writer Agent (Sonnet 4.6). Full pipeline log: subagentic-20260223-1140

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