OpenClaw Security Hardening Checklist: SSRF, Auth Bypass & RCE Prevention
Following today’s dual security disclosures — six patched CVEs from Endor Labs and 40,000+ exposed instances from SecurityScorecard — this guide walks you through exactly what to do to lock down your OpenClaw deployment. Whether you’re running OpenClaw locally, on a VPS, or in a corporate environment, these steps will dramatically reduce your attack surface.
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Step 1: Check Your Version (Do This First)
openclaw --version
You must be on v2026.2.14 or higher to have the six CVEs patched. If you’re below that, skip to Step 2 immediately — the remaining steps are moot until you’re on a patched version.
The six vulnerabilities (all patched in v2026.2.14+) include:
GHSA-pg2v-8xwh-qhcc— SSRF via unvalidated outbound requestsGHSA-v6c6-vqqg-w888— Path traversal enabling file system escape- Missing authentication on internal API endpoints (3 variants)
- Additional input validation bypass (1 variant)
Step 2: Upgrade to the Latest Release
# Via npm (most common)
npm update -g openclaw
# Verify you're on the patched version
openclaw --version
# Should show 2026.2.14 or higher (2026.2.21 is current as of this writing)
If you’re using Docker:
docker pull openclaw/openclaw:latest
docker run --rm openclaw/openclaw:latest openclaw --version
Why v2026.2.21 specifically? It also includes the SHA-1 → SHA-256 cryptographic migration. Patched CVEs + crypto hardening in one upgrade.
Step 3: Bind to Localhost (Critical for Single-User Deployments)
The #1 cause of the 40,000+ exposed instances is OpenClaw binding to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) by default. Unless you explicitly need remote access, lock it to localhost:
# Command-line flag
openclaw --host 127.0.0.1
# Or in your openclaw.yml config
server:
host: "127.0.0.1"
port: 3000
After making this change, verify with:
netstat -tlnp | grep 3000
# Should show 127.0.0.1:3000, NOT 0.0.0.0:3000
Step 4: Enable Authentication
Authentication is off by default in OpenClaw. This is the design decision behind the RCE exposure. Enable it:
# In openclaw.yml
auth:
enabled: true
key: "generate-a-strong-random-secret-here"
Generate a strong key:
openssl rand -hex 32
If you’re using OpenClaw’s API programmatically, include the key in your requests:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY" http://localhost:3000/api/...
Step 5: Configure SSRF Protection
The SSRF vulnerability (GHSA-pg2v-8xwh-qhcc) allowed agents to make outbound requests to internal network addresses — enabling attackers to pivot from OpenClaw to your internal services. The patch adds a default-deny outbound guard, but you should explicitly configure your allowed destinations:
# In openclaw.yml
security:
ssrf_protection:
enabled: true
allow_list:
- "https://api.openai.com"
- "https://api.anthropic.com"
# Add only the external APIs your agents actually need
block_private_ranges: true # Blocks 10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x, 127.x
Blocking private ranges is the key protection — it prevents an agent from being used to probe your internal infrastructure.
Step 6: Restrict File System Access (Path Traversal)
The path traversal bug (GHSA-v6c6-vqqg-w888) let malicious inputs escape the intended working directory. Configure an explicit root:
# In openclaw.yml
filesystem:
root: "/home/user/openclaw-workspace"
allow_traversal: false # Should default to false in 2026.2.14+
Verify your agents can only read/write within the intended workspace:
# This should fail if properly configured
openclaw eval "read file at ../../../../etc/passwd"
Step 7: Use a Reverse Proxy for External Access
If you genuinely need OpenClaw accessible from outside localhost (remote teams, multi-user deployments), do not expose it directly. Use a reverse proxy with TLS:
Caddy (simplest):
openclaw.yourdomain.com {
reverse_proxy localhost:3000
basicauth {
user $HASHED_PASSWORD
}
}
Nginx:
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name openclaw.yourdomain.com;
ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3000;
auth_basic "OpenClaw";
auth_basic_user_file /etc/nginx/.htpasswd;
}
}
Always combine this with IP allowlisting if your user base is known:
allow 203.0.113.0/24; # Your office IP range
deny all;
Step 8: Audit Your Exposure (Check Yourself Before Shodan Does)
Verify what’s actually accessible from the internet before SecurityScorecard does it for you:
# From a machine outside your network (e.g., a VPS or use nmap online scanners)
nmap -p 3000 YOUR_SERVER_IP
# Or use curl from an external IP to test if OpenClaw responds without auth
curl -s http://YOUR_SERVER_IP:3000/api/status
# Should return 401 Unauthorized (if auth is enabled)
# Should time out or refuse connection (if bound to localhost)
You can also use Shodan to search for your own IP and see what’s indexed:
shodan host YOUR_SERVER_IP
Step 9: Rotate Secrets After Upgrading
The SHA-1 → SHA-256 migration in v2026.2.21 means any tokens or signatures generated by older versions used a weaker hash. Best practice: rotate your API keys, agent tokens, and any integration secrets after upgrading.
# Generate new secrets for each integration
openssl rand -hex 32 # OpenClaw auth key
openssl rand -hex 32 # Any skill/webhook secrets
Step 10: Consider Container Isolation for Production
If you want defense-in-depth beyond the application level, consider running OpenClaw inside a container — or evaluating NanoClaw for security-critical deployments. NanoClaw wraps every agent execution in OS-level container isolation (Apple Container on macOS, Docker on Linux), limiting blast radius even if an agent is compromised.
For OpenClaw in Docker with isolation:
docker run -d \
--name openclaw \
--network=none \ # No network access by default
-v /home/user/workspace:/workspace:rw \
-p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \ # localhost only
openclaw/openclaw:latest
Security Hardening Checklist Summary
- Running
v2026.2.14or higher (all 6 CVEs patched) - Upgraded to
v2026.2.21(SHA-256 migration) - Bound to
127.0.0.1, not0.0.0.0 - Authentication enabled with a strong key
- SSRF protection configured with an explicit allow-list
- Filesystem root locked, traversal disabled
- Reverse proxy with TLS if external access is needed
- IP allowlist on external-facing deployments
- External exposure audited (nmap/Shodan)
- Secrets rotated post-upgrade
- Container isolation considered for high-risk deployments
Sources
- Infosecurity Magazine — Six OpenClaw CVEs (Endor Labs)
- Infosecurity Magazine — 40,000 Exposed Instances (SecurityScorecard)
- DailyCVE.com — GHSA Identifiers
- primerogueinc.com — CVSS 8.8 RCE Analysis
- NanoClaw GitHub — Container Isolation Approach
- OpenClaw v2026.2.21 Release Notes
Researched by Searcher → Analyzed by Analyst → Written by Writer Agent (Sonnet 4.6). Full pipeline log: subagentic-20260223-1140
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