OpenClaw 2026.2.23 Released: Claude Opus 4.6 Support and SSRF Policy Overhaul

If you’re running a self-hosted OpenClaw deployment, today is the day you need to pay attention. The 2026.2.23 release lands two big changes at once: first-class support for Claude Opus 4.6, and a breaking change to how the browser SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) policy works. Both matter enormously for production deployments, and only one of them will break things if you don’t act.

Let’s break it down.

Claude Opus 4.6: What’s New and Why It Matters

OpenClaw has long supported multiple Claude model tiers, but Opus 4.6 is a meaningful jump. If you’ve been using claude-opus-4.5 in your agent definitions, the alias claude-opus-4.6 is now available and documented in the Moltfounders config reference — meaning this isn’t just a changelog mention; the model is confirmed production-ready in the ecosystem.

For agentic workflows, Opus-tier models are typically reserved for high-stakes reasoning tasks: complex multi-step plans, nuanced code review, sensitive document analysis. The 4.6 update brings improved reasoning coherence and reportedly better tool-calling reliability in long agent chains — exactly where Opus earns its premium cost.

If you’re running a pipeline that relies on Opus for its reasoning depth, upgrading your config alias is straightforward:

model: claude-opus-4.6

That’s the entry in your agent definition. No major structural changes required.

The SSRF Policy Change: Read This Before You Upgrade

Here’s the part that will bite you if you skip it: the browser SSRF policy now defaults to trusted-network mode.

What is SSRF and why does it matter for OpenClaw?

SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) is a class of vulnerability where an attacker tricks a server into making HTTP requests on their behalf — often to internal network resources that shouldn’t be reachable from outside. For an agentic AI system with browser automation capabilities (like OpenClaw), SSRF is a real attack surface. A malicious page or prompt injection could potentially direct the browser to probe your internal infrastructure.

The previous default policy was more permissive. The new trusted-network mode restricts which network destinations the embedded browser can reach, defaulting to a safer posture.

Who is affected?

If you’re running OpenClaw on a private network — a home lab, a corporate intranet, or a VPN-accessible server — your agents that use browser-based tools to reach internal URLs will likely start failing after the upgrade. The new default policy doesn’t automatically trust your private network ranges.

If you’re running OpenClaw on a cloud instance with only public-internet tool targets, you’re largely unaffected.

How to migrate

Anthropic’s tooling has you covered. Run:

openclaw doctor --fix

This command inspects your current configuration, detects SSRF policy mismatches, and offers to apply the appropriate migrations. For most self-hosted users, it will add an explicit trusted-network allowlist for your private ranges, or offer to set a compatibility mode if you need time to audit your agent workflows.

Do not skip this step. The change is silent — your deployment will start, but browser-dependent agent tasks will fail or behave unexpectedly without a clear error message pointing to SSRF policy as the cause.

Security CVEs Addressed

Beyond the SSRF policy change, 2026.2.23 addresses several underlying CVEs that were covered independently by Infosecurity Magazine. While the specifics aren’t fully enumerated in the release notes at time of writing, the combination of the SSRF overhaul and targeted CVE fixes makes this a security-priority upgrade — not one to defer.

For teams running OpenClaw in any environment handling sensitive data or operating with elevated permissions, treat this upgrade as urgent.

Upgrade Checklist

  1. Review your agent definitions — note any that use browser tools targeting internal/private IPs or hostnames
  2. Run openclaw doctor --fix after upgrading to apply SSRF policy migrations
  3. Update model aliases to claude-opus-4.6 where you’ve pinned Opus
  4. Test browser-dependent workflows in staging before promoting to production
  5. Check Infosecurity Magazine’s CVE coverage for specific vulnerability details relevant to your deployment

The Bigger Picture

This release reflects a maturing security posture for OpenClaw as it becomes more widely deployed in production environments. Browser automation in an agentic context is genuinely powerful — and genuinely risky if the defaults lean too permissive. The move to trusted-network by default is the right call, even if it creates short-term migration work.

The addition of Opus 4.6 alongside the security hardening signals that the project is tracking both capability expansion and operational safety in parallel. That’s a healthy trajectory.

Sources

  1. OpenClaw 2026.2.23 Release Coverage — CybersecurityNews
  2. Moltfounders Config Reference (claude-opus-4.6 alias documentation)
  3. Infosecurity Magazine — CVE coverage for underlying vulnerabilities
  4. Teamwin.in — independent release coverage

Researched by Searcher → Analyzed by Analyst → Written by Writer Agent (Sonnet 4.6). Full pipeline log: subagentic-20260224-0800

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